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A definition of the concept of law is developed by drawing on the
works of jurists and anthropologists as well as sociologists. Law is
conceptualized in terms of Sumner's definition of an institution,
the "concept" being the normative law and the "apparatus" being
the group engaging in legal action. The rudimentary forms of legal
norms and of legal actions which exist in all legal institutions are
identified and described. The process by which these rudimentary
forms of legalnorms and of legal actions develop so as to constitute
the wide variety of legal institutions which exist or have existed is
also examined.
In a recent article Malcolm Feeley (1976:503) observed that:
"Most contemporary research on law and society suffers from its
unwillingness to even consider a definition of the concept of law
and hence the boundaries of investigation." This reluctance is
perhaps the most widely shared feature of social scientists
interested in law.
This reluctance to consider a definition of the concept of law
is not due to a lack of previous attempts to define law. For, as
Paul Bohannon (1967:43) points out: "It is likely that more
scholarship has gone into defining and explaining the concept of
'law' than any other concept still in central use in the social
sciences." Rather, the contemporary reluctance to consider a
definition of the concept of law is due to the great variety of
contradictory definitions which have been previously developed.
These contradictory definitions have led many scholars to refuse
to define law altogether and to even regard such a task as almost
impossible (Pospisil, 1972). Max Radin (1938:1145) exemplifies
these pessimistic scholars when he writes: "Those of us who have
47
Mid-American Review of Sociology
learned humility have given over the attempts to define law."
The problematic nature of developing a conceptual
identification of law is due not to the complexity of the
phenomena, but rather to two kinds of erroneous thinking. The
first type of erroneous thinking is the assumption that law is not a
concept but a phenomenon that somehow can be objectively and
absolutely defined. As Leopold Pospisil (1972: 6) points out:
Law stands for a concept, for a category composed of individual
social phenomena. Although phenomena do exist in the world
outside of the mind, categories do not. They are mental constructs,
relative in time and space to the individual user and to the purpose
for which they have been constructed. Justification of the concept
of law, then, does not reside in its objective existence but in its
heuristic value as an analytical device. Thus, since the law concept
is not absolute, and since the phenomena dealing with social
control is an objective, unsegmented continuum, law can and has
been defined in many ways.
Moreover, although a definition should be precise, with an
attempt to define exactly the term's semantic boundaries, the
factual continuum makes it impossible to place all the phenomena
within or without such a category.
The second type of erroneous thinking which has led to the
overly problematic nature of developing a conceptual
identification of law is the insistence that essentially empirical
questions about law be answered by conceptions of law. In other
words, some writers fail to distinguish two separate questions
regarding the study of law: 1) what is law? and 2) what is to be
asked about law? Concepts of law are directed toward answering
the first question, but not the second. Questions about law-such
as what is the function of law, or how does law develop-are
predominantly empirical and cannot be answered by conceptual
analysis (Gibbs, 1973).
In this paper I shall attempt to develop a conceptual
identification of law, the value of which lies in its utility as an
analytical device which can be used in investigating a wide variety
of empirical questions concerned with law. Many of the elements
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constituting this conception of law have been borrowed from
jurists and anthropologists as well as sociologists. Although jurists
and anthropologists are concerned with questions, problems, and
subsets of phenomena which are different from the questions,
problems, and subsets with which sociologists are concerned, the
complex of phenomena constituting law is the same no matter
who studies it. In this sense, the concept of law which is to be
developed in this paper is interdisciplinary.
This concept of law is based on the assumption that part of
what we refer to as "law" is one aspect or part of the phenomenon
of culture, and part is one aspect or part of the phenomenon of
social organization (Warriner, 1976). Conceptualizing law in these
terms will involve two steps: 1) isolating law from other related,
but different phenomena; and 2) describing law in terms of
universal phenomena. Given the diversity of actors, functions and
phenomena which have been subsumed under the concept "law," it
is important to develop a universal classification of elements that
should be included in what we mean by law. The classification
should be applicable across cultures.
THE CONCEPT OF LAW
Before proceeding to these discussions, it might be useful at
this point to briefly outline the class of phenomena included
within the concept of law. The term "law" refers to two main
types of phenomena: 1) a body of statements (written or oral)
constituting the rules, norms, and prescriptions (Le., "laws")
which have either been explicitly formulated, or which have come
to be accepted as authoritative and legitimate; and 2) actions
which express or implement these statements of the rules, and
which are of two kinds: a) those which formulate, codify, refine,
elaborate on, supplement, and explain the rule statements; and
b) those which use the rules as a basis for sanctioning rule
violators, or as a basis for adjudicating conflicts between actors.
Law in these terms is best conceptualized as an institution.
The institution of law is thus composed of normative law, a body
of statements, and legal action, a set of organized activities which
express or implement the body of statements. As the following
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discussion will indicate, law as an institution emerges when
normative law becomes differentiated from the other elements of
culture, and when legal action becomes differentiated from the
other elements of social organization, that is, when legal action is
assigned to special actors who formulate and implement the
normative law.
The value of concepts lies not in their correspondence to
phenomenal reality, but rather in their capacity to structure
phenomenal reality. Concepts are tools which provide us a means
for making some sense out of the infinite complexity of
phenomenal reality. Accordingly, concepts are not more or less
correct or incorrect, but rather more or less useful or not useful.
The concept of law which will be developed in this paper is a
useful tool for several reasons.
This concept of law is useful because it includes both the
cultural and the social organizational aspects of law. Law is more
than simply a matter of abstract rules, principles, or legal decisions
because these norms must be created, interpreted, enforced, and
adjudicated (Selznick, 1961). Similarly, law is more than simply a
matter of enforcement and the settlement of disputes because
these actions are intended to be guided by norms (Selznick, 1968).
In studying law we must consider both the norms and the actions,
i.e., both parts of the institution of law. An undue emphasis on
one at the expense of the other will only result in an incomplete
picture.
Another reason this concept of law is useful is because it
conceptualizes normative law in terms of cultural phenomena and
legal action in terms of social organizational phenomena. In other
words" it does not define normative law in terms of legal action or
vice versa. Such a conception allows us to empirically determine
the extent to which the actions which in fact occur correspond to
the prescriptions of how the actions should occur. The extent to
which action corresponds to normative law must be empirically
determined, not conceptually assumed.
A closely related reason this concept of law is useful is
because it accounts for the fact that the external objects (norms)
which represent legal collective understandings may take one of
two forms. Legal norms may take the form of explicit abstract
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rules which are either written or remembered, which make up the
content of legal codifications. Legal norms may also take the form
of concrete adjudicative decisions. These decisions are normative
in the sense that they are regarded as being applicable to all future
cases involving similar actions (Pospisil, 1972).
This concept of law does not define law in terms of its
function. It does not state, for example, that the function of law is
the legitimation of authority, or the protection of the interests of
the ruling class, or the reaffirmation of the collective conscience,
or the resolution of conflict, or the regulation of behavior. The
function or functions of law must be empirically determined, not
conceptually assumed.
This concept of law defines law in terms of phenomena
existing in all societies and in all functioning subgroups. This is not
to say that legal phenomena do not vary a great deal from society
to society and from subgroup to subgroup. It is only to say that
there exists an identifiable element or attribute which
characterizes all legal phenomena and which serves to distinguish
legal phenomena from other related but different phenomena,
namely, that all legal phenomena are a part of an institution.
This concept of law recognizes the overlapping nature of
social phenomena. It identifies the orders of phenomena which are
most interrelated with that set which we label "law." Law, power,
ethics, custom and morality do not exist in reality as separate and
distinct sets of phenomena. Rather, they all belong to the same
continuum with imperceptible transitions leading from one to the
other (Weber, 1954).
Finally, this concept of law is useful because it recognizes the
complexity and variety of legal phenomena. It identifies several
different types and subtypes of normative law and of legal action,
and it allows for more types to be added. It is elaborate and
detailed. Although they can never account for the totality of
phenomenal reality, concepts must be elaborated as rigorously and
as unequivocably as possible so as to avoid confusion of problems
and confusion of phenomena. Furthermore, concepts which are
elaborate are more useful in analyzing the singularity of a
particular event, as well as the similarity among different events
(Freund, 1968).
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ISOLATING LAW FROM
OTHER RELATED BUT DIFFERENT PHENOMENA
The first step in developing a conception of law as an
institution is to isolate law from other related, but different orders
of phenomena. Power, ethics, morality and custom are all
intertwined in the set of phenomena we call law. Accordingly, in
distinguishing law from these other orders of phenomena, we face
two questions: 1) to what extent does law depend upon and is
coterminous with power, ethics, morality and custom; and
2) when are these general orders of phenomena a part of law and
when are they not? Answering these questions is crucial because of
the overlapping nature of social phenomena. Law, power, ethics,
and morality do not exist in reality as separate and distinct
phenomena, but rather belong to the same continuum with
imperceptible transitions leading from one to the other.
Power and law are coterminous to the extent that they share
several common elements. Both involve to some extent the
direction and control of human action, both imply subordination
to authority, and both do not extend beyond a particular social
group. Moreover, the existence of legal rights and legal rules
necessarily implies power because individuals or groups use power
to enforce such rights and rules through the legal institutions.
Finally, power and law are intertwined in that the makers,
interpreters, administrators, and enforcers of law possess
considerable potential and actual power in a society.
Ethics and law are interrelated in two general ways. First,
ethical values are often embodied in normative law. For example,
prohibitions against murder and theft are ethical values as well as
legal rules. Second, one type of ethical value is the ideal of
legality. The ideal of legality is a complex body of values about
what the legal order should be, what rules and judicial decisions
ought to be, how they ought to be created, interpreted, and
applied, and what the function of the legal order ought to be.
These values often play a controlling part in the development,
interpretation, and application of legal rules included within the
ideal of legality in our own society are such values as "due process
of law," "civil liberties," "equal protection of the law," and
"fundamental fairness."
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Custom, morality, and law are all intertwined in that they are
all directed toward the same environment, namely, the social
environment. All three are directed toward relating members of
the group to each other and to nonmembers. Furthermore,
custom, morality, and law all involve norms of behavior, and to
some extent observable regularities of social action (patterns of
action which have a typically identical meaning and which are
repeated by the actors or simultaneously occur among many
actors). A third interrelationship between custom, morality, and
law is that certain norms and actions may simultaneously be a part
of all three.
Although law to some extent depends upon and is
coterminous with power, ethics, morality and custom, these other
general orders of phenomena are not always a part of law. The key
to determining when these phenomena are a part of law and when
they 'are not lies in the concept of an institution. William Graham
Sumner (1967 :352) defined an institution in the following
manner.
An institution consists of a concept (idea, notion, doctrine,
interest) and a structure. The structure is a framework, or
apparatus, or perhaps only a number of functionaries set to
cooperate in prescribed ways at a certain conjuncture. The
structure holds the concept and furnishes instrumentalities for
bringing it into the world of facts and action in a way to serve the
in terests of men in society.
The legal institution, using Sumner's point of view, consists
of an apparatus or a specific body of actors who are assigned
responsibility for the concept (i.e., "the law"), and who
implement that concept by formulating laws and by using them in
adjudicating conflicts between parties or between an individual
and society. In the terms used in this paper, the "concept" of the
legal institution is the normative law (the body of rule
statements), and the "apparatus" is the group which engages in
legal action (the set of organized activities implementing the
normative law).
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Law thus exists on a different level from power, ethics,
custom, and morality because it is an institution. Law is separated
out from the ongoing activity of the group, and is given a more or
less permanent, prevalent, and independent place in the life of the
group. Power is a part of the legal institution when it is exercised
by the legal apparatus in legal action. Similarly, ethics, custom,
and morality are a part of the legal institution when their norms
and values are implemented or enforced by the legal apparatus in
legal action.
DEFINING LAW IN TERMS OF UNIVERSAL PHENOMENA
Having isolated the complex of phenomena we call law from
the related, but different orders of phenomena we call power,
ethics, custom, and morality, the next step in developing a
conceptual identification of law is to describe the legal institution.
In other words, after we have circumscribed an area of
phenomenal reality and labelled it "law," we must describe the
complex of phenomena contained in that area. This step is
problematic if the concept of law is to be used in cross-societal
comparative analysis because the complex of phenomena to which
the concept refers must exist in all societies.
Yet it cannot be denied that the legal institution varies a
great deal from society to society. The complex of phenomena
which makes up the legal institution of u.S. society is
considerably different from that which makes up the legal
institution of Eskimo society. The u.s. legal institution is made up
of federal, state, and local legislatures; appellate and trial courts;
jails, prisons, and penitentiaries; federal, state, and local police;
lawyers and judges; and a variety of other activities; structures,
and actors. The Eskimo legal institution, on the other hand, is
primarily made up of the shaman, headmen, and song duels.
Our problem, then, is twofold. First, we must identify and
describe the rudimentary forms of legal norms and actions which
exist in all legal institutions. Second, we must indicate how these
rudimentary forms of actions and norms develop so as to
constitute the wide variety of legal institutions which exist or have
existed.
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THE RUDIMENTS OF THE INSTITUTION OF LAW
As we saw in the last section, law is an institution composed
of a certain set of collective understandings (normative law), and a
certain set of social actions (legal action). Accordingly, the first
step in describing the rudiments of the legal institution is to
explain in what sense it is composed of "understandings" which
are "collective" and of actions which are "social."
The "understandings" of the legal institution are
prescriptions about how actors should act, rather than descriptions
of how actors do in fact act. Members of a group come to agree
that certain actions in certain situations are the correct or proper
way to act. But that does not mean that most or even some
members of the group will act in accordance with these
agreements at all times. Indeed, legal understandings often differ
from the actual behavior of the members of the group. Prescribed
behavior is a set of phenomena different from actual behavior, and
normative law is composed of the former, not the latter.
Legal understandings are not simply a commonality or an
average of individual prescriptions of proper behavior. Rather,
they are a product of interaction, and are in this sense collective
understandings. That legal understandings are collective does not
imply that all members of the group have participated in the
interactions which produced the legal understandings, nor that all
members personally accept the understandings, nor that all
members have knowledge of the understandings. The fact that
legal understandings are collective only implies: 1) that they
emerge from interactions between certain individuals who are
socially recognized as able to agree upon prescriptions of proper
behavior for the group as a whole; and 2) that they are intended
and recognized as the official prescriptions of the group.
Legal actions are "social" because their meaning and purpose
are shared and recognized not only by the individuals engaged in
the action, but also by all members of the group in which the
action occurs. Legal actions are recognized by all members of the
group because their conception arises in the history of the group
and is a result of the characteristics of the group (Warriner, 1970).
autonomous legal norms in our own legal system are those statutes
which are never enforced by the police or the courts, but which
nevertheless remain as a part of our normative law.
It is also possible for legal acts to exist external to legal
norms. Legal acts exist autonomously in the sense that it is
possible for legal acts to be created or changed without at the
same time creating or changing the legal norms to legitimate the
new acts. The new legal acts are informally legitimated. This
autonomy of normative law and legal action makes it possible, and
indeed necessary, to conceptualize normative law as a set of
phenomena distinct from that of legal action.
A second important point which must be noted is that the
rudiments of the legal institution have not been described in terms
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The second step in describing the rudiments of the legal
institution is to identify the norms and acts which are
fundamental to all institutions of law. Considering the
fundamental norms first, there are two types of norms which exist
in all legal institutions: 1) primary legal norms prescribing the
proper actions in certain circumstances; and 2) secondary legal
norms prescribing the proper actions by which the institutional
structure implements the primary legal norms. We may call the
former set of legal norms substantive law, and the latter set
institutional or procedural law.
Institutional law may be further divided into two subtypes of
norms which exist in all legal institutions: 1) norms prescribing the
proper way to create, interpret, display, state, and recognize
substantive norms; and 2) norms prescribing the proper way to
detect, adjudicate, and react to violations of the substantive norms
(Hart, 1961). We may call the former set of institutional norms
elaboration norms, and the latter set enforcement norms.
Turning to the fundamen tal acts of the legal institution, we
also find two types of acts which exist in all institutions of law:
elaborating acts and enforcing acts. Elaborating acts are those acts
which are actually involved in creating, interpreting, displaying,
stating, and recognizing substantive norms, and which are carried
out by those with the prescribed power of so acting. Enforcing
acts are those acts which are actually involved in detecting,
adjudicating, and reacting to violations of the substantive norms,
and which are carried out by those with the prescribed power of
so acting.
These rudiments of the legal institution are illustrated in the
following diagram.
It is important to note that in describing the rudiments of the
legal institution, normative law and legal actions have been dealt
with separately. Although both normative law and legal action are
constituent parts of the legal institution, they are distinct sets of
phenomena. We must conceptually separate normative law and
legal action because it is possible for each to exist external to the
other (Warriner, 1970). It is possible for legal collective
understandings to exist as autonomous social facts which are not
represented by a particular set of legal actions. Examples of
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of the state. Law neither exists only in politically organized
society, nor only on the societal level. On the contrary, every
functioning group or subgroup of a society may possess its own
legal institution, which permits the group to function by
compelling its members to conform to common norms of
behaviour. A society is not usually composed of an
undifferentiated group of actors. It is a patterned combination of
subgroups with different memberships, functions, and degrees of
inclusiveness. The very existence of anyone of the subgroups is
dependent upon the enforcement of its own legal norms. The
existence of a legal institution is of vital necessity to any
functioning subgroup because offenses within such a group cannot
go unpunished, and because disputes cannot be allowed to
continue indefinitely lest they destroy the group.
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INSTITUTION OF LAW
Having identified and described the rudimentary norms and
actions which exist in all legal institutions, the next problem in
describing law in universal terms is indicating how these
rudimentary norms and actions develop so as to constitute the
wide variety of legal institutions which exist or have existed. The
solution to this problem lies in understanding the processes of
institutional differentiation and specialization. The rudimentary
norms and actions are the elements of the simplest legal
institutions, as well as the most complex legal institutions, in the
sense that they may exist in a wide variety of more or less
differentiated and specialized forms.
In describing the development of the institution of law in the
following pages, I will focus on the logical progression of
increasing differentiation in normative law and legal action. This
discussion of differentiation in the legal institution should not be
commenced without identifying three ideas which are not implied
by what will be said below. First, there is no implication that there
is any necessity for increasing differentiation. In other words,
increasing differentiation is not inevitable. Second, there is no
implication that, once it has begun, differentiation will continue.
Differentiation is not irreversible. Finally, there is no implication
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that there are stages of differentiation. Differentiation is not
sequential.
In the simplest legal institutions, the rudimentary legal norms
are undifferentiated. The norms of how the members of the group
should act and the collective understanding of how these norms
should be implemented are both embodied in similar precedents.
These precedents are recollections of concrete situations in which
certain actions were reacted to in certain ways. These precedents
are norms in the sense that they are regarded as being applicable to
all future cases involving similar actions.
Gradually, the norms of how the members of the group
should act may separate from the norms of how the institutional
structure should implement the norms of behavior. Substantive
law becomes differentiated from institutional law. Certain
precedents are remembered because they embody the proper
actions in certain situations, while other precedents are
remembered because they embody the proper procedure for the
institutional apparatus.
Substantive law may further differentiate into private and
public law. Private, substantive legal norms are best conceptualized
in terms of rights and their reciprocal duties or obligations, and
the parties to which they are attached. Some private legal norms
confer upon certain actors the power to create a legal relationship
consisting of rights and duties which are enforceable by legal
coercion, while other norms prescribe the respective legal rights
and duties of each party in the relationship. For example, in our
legal system some legal norms confer the power to contract upon
those who have reached the age of majority, and who are of a
sound mind. Other legal norms prescribe that one who has
performed a duty under a contract has a right to be paid a
compensation for his performance, and that one who has received
a benefit under a contract has a duty to pay for that benefit. The
importance of conceptualizing private legal norms in terms of
rights and duties is that all legal relations are between actors and
not things. There can be no rights against things, but only rights
against persons in respect to things. For example, legal norms
concerning ownership of property do not prescribe rights of the
owner against the property, but rather rights of the owner against
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all others in respect to the property. Private, substantive legal
norms are regarded as protecting individuals or groups from injury
by other individuals or °groups.
Public, substantive legal norms are prescriptions of actions
from which to refrain. In other words, public legal norms forbid
certain actions. The prescribed, forbidden actions are regarded as
harmful to the group as a whole, and thus public legal norms are
regarded as protecting the group as a whole from injury. In one
sense, all legal norms are concerned with resolving conflicts
between actors. From this point of view, public legal norms are
concerned with resolving conflicts between an individual (the
violator) and the society as a collection of others.
The two fundamental types of institutional law, elaboration
and enforcement norms, may also separate from each other. Those
who are allocated the authority of elaborating the law may
become different from those who are allocated the authority of
enforcing the law. Accordingly, the norms governing those who
are to elaborate the law will be different from the norms governing
those who are to enforce the law.
Elaboration norms may further differentiate into at least
three types of specialized elaboration norms: 1) norms of change
or creation; 2) norms of interpretation; and 3) norms of form.
Norms of change are collective understandings that new legal
norms should be introduced and old ones repealed by deliberate
enactment. It is collectively understood that a norm can only be
endowed with, or deprived of, legal status by direct human action.
Accordingly, prescriptions of change identify which individuals or
groups should change the legal norms and what acts are required in
doing so.
Legal norms of interpretation are collective understandings
about who should determine the extent of the normative law
(including the institutional law itself), the internal consistency of
the normative law, and the precise meaning of particular legal
norms; and how they should go about doing so.
Legal norms of form, the third type of specialized
elaboration norms, are prescriptions about how legal norms
(institutional as well as substantive) should be represented. They
are prescriptions about whether legal norms should be represented
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in explicit abstract rules or in concrete precedents. Legal norms in
the form of abstract rules generally do not exist outside Western
civilization. There are many tribal societies, including those of the
North American Indians, in which legal abstract rules simply do
not exist; the members of these societies are reported to have no
conception of legal norms in the form of explicit abstract rules.
Even within the Western world, legal abstract rules are
conceptualized differently in different legal systems. In most
continental European legal systems, legal abstract rules are
collectively understood as being the primary form of law.
Consequently, it is agreed that they should be applied to cases
involving actions which do not objectively match the prescribed
actions of the abstract rules. On the other hand, in the North
American and British legal systems, legal abstract rules are
collectively understood as being only the secondary form of law
(legal precedents or decisions being the primary form).
Consequently, it is agreed that they should only be applied to
cases involving actions which objectively match the prescribed
actions oofthe abstract rules.
Like elaboration norms, enforcement norms may further
differentiate into at least two types of specialized enforcement
norms: 1) norms of adjudication; and 2) norms of reaction.
Legal norms of adjudication are collective understandings
about who should make authoritative determinations about
whether, on a certain occasion, particular concrete actions were
contrary to the legal norms, and how this determination should be
made. Adjudicative norms may further differentiate into at least
three more specialized norms: detection, initiation, and forensic.
Norms of detection prescribe who should discover concrete
actions which might. be contrary to the normative law, and how
they should go about doing so. Norms of initiation prescribe who
should bring the case before the individual or group making the
authoritative determination, which cases should be considered by
the "court," which "court" should consider which cases if there
are several "courts," and finally how the proper case should be
brought before the proper "court." Forensic norms prescribe who
should make the authoritative determination, what sequence of
actions should be involved, what evidence can be considered, how
61
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the evidence can be gathered, what subset of substantive law is
applicable, and what standards should be used for determining if
the action in question violated the normative law. In some legal
systems these three types of adjudicative norms are relatively
simple, while in other legal systems they are relatively complex.
Legal norms of reaction, the second type of specialized
enforcement norms, are collective understandings concerning: who
should react to actions which have been determined to be contrary
to the normative law; what reactions should be used and to what
extent should they be limited; toward whom should the reactions
be directed-the actual perpretrator, the group to which he
belongs, or both; and what purpose or purposes should be
accomplished. by the reactions-protection of the group,
reparation, revenge, expiation, deterrence, reformation, or
reintegration.
The diagram on the following page summarizes the possible
differentiations and specializations which may occur in the
normative law.
Turning now to legal action, in the simplest legal institutions,
the 'rudimentary legal acts are undifferentiated. The acts which
elaborate the norms are not clearly separate from the acts which
enforce the norms. When the institutional apparatus reacts to
certain actions in certain circumstances, it is at the same time
identifying particular norms.
Gradually, the elaborating acts may become separate from
the enforcing acts. One individual or group may create, interpret,
display, or state the normative law, while another individual or
group may detect, adjudicate, and react to violations of the
normative law. Even where they are carried out by the same
actors, elaborating and enforcing acts may be differentiated if they
are carried out at different times or places.
Once they are separated from enforcing acts, elaborating acts
may further differentiate into more specialized sets of acts. There
are at least two sets of more specialized elaborating acts: 1) acts
exclusively changing normative law; and 2) acts exclusively
interpreting normative law.
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Acts changing normative law necessarily occur more or less
frequently because norms can only become a part of, or be
removed from, normative law by deliberate human action. A norm
does not cease to be a part of normative law merely because the
members of the group regard it is no longer im.portant or worth
maintaining. Acts changing normative law may involve interaction
among all or part of those who are concerned, or they may involve
imposition by a dominating individual or group.
Acts interpreting normative law may serve at least two
functions. First, they may be directed toward the normative law
itself, and thus function to develop, elaborate, and maintain the
internal consistency of the normative law. Second, they may be
directed toward those who are subject to the normative law, and
thus function to advise or counsel those who are expected to
follow the normative law. These acts of advising are not exclusive
to Western societies for they exist in such societies as Cambodia,
Indonesia, and Syria.
Like elaborating acts, enforcing acts may also differentiate
further into more specialized sets of acts. There are at least two
sets of more specialized enforcing acts: 1) acts exclusively
adjudicating normative law; and 2) acts exclusively reacting to
violations of the normative law.
Acts adjudicating normative law are those acts which are
involved in the process of making authoritative determinations
about whether, on given occasions, particular concrete actions
were contrary to the normative law. Adjudicative acts may further
differentiate into even more specialized acts: detection, initiation,
and forensic. Acts of detection involve discovering or publicly
complaining about concrete actions which might be contrary to
the normative law. Such acts may be performed either by those
directly involved or affected by the action in question, or by an
independent actor or group of actors who act on behalf of the
group as as whole. Acts of initiation involve deciding which
actions or cases are to be considered by the "court," disengaging
the appropriate cases from their nonlegal settings, and engaging
them into the processes of the appropriate "court."
Forensic acts involve actually deciding whether the particular
concrete actions in question were contrary to the normative law.
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Such acts include listening to the claims of both sides to the
dispute; selecting the evidence, legal norms, and standards which
are appropriate; and weighing all the relevant facts. Forensic acts
are influenced not only by normative law, but also by morality,
custom, and social status of the actors involved, and subjective
factors such as "fairness" and "justice."
Forensic acts are performed by one or more actors who
constitute a "court." The essential characteristic of a court is
authority. Any legal decision has to be accepted by the parties to a
dispute or forced on them if they protest or resist. Obviously, not
all members of a group can hand down such a decision. It requires
an individual who has sufficient power at his disposal to enforce
the decision, either by persuasion or by psychological or physical
compulsion. In all groups there exist certain outstanding,
important actors who regularly assume leadership and solve
intra-group disputes. These actors initiate action in the group,
resolve its problems, and occupy positions of greater or lesser
importance. A "court," then, is one or more actors whose advice
and decisions are usually followed by the rest of the members of
the group.
Forensic acts may serve two functions. First, they may be
limited only to the particular case in question, and therefore only
serve to decide that a particular concrete action is contrary to, or
in accordance with, the normative law. Second, in addition to
deciding the particular case in question, a legal decision may be
intended to be applied to all similar or "identical" cases in the
future. Such a decision serves to establish a new norm which
becomes a part of normative law.
Acts reacting to violations of the normative law, the second
type of institutional legal acts, may take a variety of forms. One
type of reaction is privileged force. Privileged force consists of
positive acts for inflicting some painful experience-sphysical,
psychological, or social. The force involved in these acts is
privileged or legitimated because there is a low probability of
retaliation by actors other than the actor or actors at whom the
force is directed. Even if the actor who acts contrary to legal
norms uses force to resist coercion, the coercion is privileged as
long as other parties do not retaliate. Thus, coercion is not
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deter future illegal action; or, they may function to compensate
those injured by the illegal action. Alternatively, reactions may
function to rehabilitate the offender, to rebuild solid ties between
the offender and group life, or to maintain or reaffirm the
normative law.
The following diagram summarizes the possible
differentiations and specializations which may occur in legal
action.
The central assertion in this discussion of the development of
legal action is simply that differentiation occurs in legal action in
the sense that there is an increasing division of labor with respect
to legal action. The various types of legal action increasingly
separate from one another in that each is assigned to special actors
who exclusively perform one type of legal action. Elaborating acts
are assigned to one special legal apparatus, while enforcing acts are
assigned to another apparatus. Acts of change or creation are then
assigned to an even more specialized apparatus, while acts of
interpretation are assigned to another more specialized apparatus.
Similarly, acts of reaction are assigned to a more specialized legal
apparatus, while acts of adjudication are assigned to another more
specialized apparatus. The process of differentiation thus occurs in
legal action as legal acts become more specific, and are assigned to
more specialized legal apparatuses.
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privileged when the perpetrator can rely on other actors using
force to rally to his cause.
A second type of specialized reaction is psychological
sanction. Psychological sanctions include such acts as ridicule,
ostracism, avoidance, excommunication, and denial of favors
which would have been granted had not the law been violated. A
third type of reaction involves appeals to fear or interest. A fourth
type of reaction is reparation or indemnification which involves
the payment of something of value by one party to another party.
A fifth type of reaction consists of acts designed to reform the
offender or to reintegrate him back into the life of the group.
Reactions to violations of the normative law are carried out
by a staff of one or more actors who h~ld thems~lves specially
ready for that purpose. This staff holds Itself specially rea~y to
react, on its own initiative or at the request of others, to illegal
action with coercive as well as noncoercive actions. This special
staff is limited in number for it usually does not include all the
members of the group in which it exists. Furthermore, the
relationship between the special staff and the perpetrators of
illegal action is universalistic, rather than particularistic. The
special staff is reacting to the perpetrators as an arm of the group,
rather than as a collection of interested individuals.
The special reaction staff carries out the reactions according
to some traditional and recognized procedure. Reactions to
violations of the normative law may also be carried out by
members of the group acting as individuals. Expressions of
resentment, disapproval, and indignation of illegal action are
examples of such reactions (Timascheff, 1939). Yet, although
these diffuse reactions are often more effective in enforcing the
normative law than the organized reactions, they always remain
supplemental to the organized reactions. The diffuse reactions are
never regarded as sufficient in themselves to properly react to
violations of the normative law. (Radcliffe-Brown, 1952).
Reactions to violations of the normative law may serve a
variety of intended purposes. For instance, reactions may functio~
as social defenses by which harm to the group as a whole IS
avoided; they may function to restore the social equilibrium which
has been disrupted by the illegal action; they may function to
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In analyzing a legal institution, it is very important to
determine the level of differentiation of the institution as a whole
because an important consequence of the increasing
differentiation in legal action and in normative law is a greater and
greater separation of the legal institution from the society as a
whole. This separation may proceed to the point where the
substance of what specialized legal actors do is quite different
from what a common consensus prescribes as appropriate for them
to do. Such a separation may exist even where the substance of
what specialized legal actors do is entirely in conformity with
institutional norms. Such a separation is possible because the
institutional norms are themselves created by specialized legal
actors, rather than by a common consensus of the society.
Examples of this separation of the legal institution from the
society as a whole are legal norms and actions which are unpopular
in terms of the members of society, but which are perfectly
legitimate in terms of the institutional norms.
All of this involves a strain between the legal institution on
the one hand, and the larger society and its social organization on
the other hand. This strain may be especially acute when the legal
institution comes to serve one segment of a pluralistic society and
not the other segments. This strain may lead to: 1) questions of
the legitimacy of the existing legal institution; 2) attempts to
change the existing institutional norms; or 3) attempts to set up a
competing legal institution, or to disrupt the functioning of the
established legal institution.
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